What is the "pronomian" account of goodness?
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be called various things.
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be combined with "'X is good' = 'I want X.'" Hobbes endorses the combination of these formulas.
It's a cynical endorsement, because Hobbes doesn't really give a shit about promi…
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be called various things.
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be combined with "'X is good' = 'I want X.'" Hobbes endorses the combination of these formulas.
It's a cynical endorsement, because Hobbes doesn't really give a shit about promise-keeping -- not in any deep way.
Which may be why Curtis has said "Might makes right" at least a couple of times.
Hobbes's cynicism has nothing whatsoever in common with Biblical, Stoic, or Platonic accounts of what goodness and obligation boil down to. He likes honesty, sure; everyone likes someone else's honesty.
What is the "pronomian" account of goodness?
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be called various things.
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be combined with "'X is good' = 'I want X.'" Hobbes endorses the combination of these formulas.
It's a cynical endorsement, because Hobbes doesn't really give a shit about promise-keeping -- not in any deep way.
Which may be why Curtis has said "Might makes right" at least a couple of times.
Hobbes's cynicism has nothing whatsoever in common with Biblical, Stoic, or Platonic accounts of what goodness and obligation boil down to. He likes honesty, sure; everyone likes someone else's honesty.