Any kind of "Good = maximizes-people's-X-on-average" doctrine can be called "Utilitarianism". X doesn't have to be pleasure, whatever that is.
Curtis has said that he wants to maximize every group's average feeling-okay-about-life-ness, which suggests that he diverges from this general formula in that groupings of individuals play some…
Any kind of "Good = maximizes-people's-X-on-average" doctrine can be called "Utilitarianism". X doesn't have to be pleasure, whatever that is.
Curtis has said that he wants to maximize every group's average feeling-okay-about-life-ness, which suggests that he diverges from this general formula in that groupings of individuals play some role in the calculation, but he hasn't made it clear exactly how the calculation is to be done. Presumably group-populations are discounted to some extent if not entirely -- otherwise the groupings would be irrelevant. So, for example, if there are 99 million Euros and 1 million Navajos, the Euro-group's average feeling-okay-about-life-ness quantity wouldn't matter 99 times as much as the average Navajo quantity. Would it matter twice as much, thought?
He also diverges from the general "utilitarian" formula in that he seems to think that no situation will be good if even a single group's members feel on average that their lives are crappy.
Maybe he'd say, "When I say 'good' and 'should' I'm just telling you what my friend the coming dictator and I want. We want every group's members to feel okay about life on average. If you share our desire then follow us and we'll get it done."
Another guy might agree that "X is good" means "I want X" but want the maximizing of average pleasure pure and simple. In that case he'd push "hedonic utilitarianism" as a practical program but he wouldn't be a utilitarian in a theoretical sense. Similarly, a "divine command theorist" might think that God has commanded us to maximize average pleasure.
Pronomianism is like traditional ethics, which is all about honesty. If the Europeans promise to respect the Navajo territory, then invade it, they have done evil. But if they've made no such promise, well, who really owns a piece of land? Their ancestors killed the previous inhabitants and so on. Total utility? Would they think about my utility, if the situation was reversed? If the answer is no, why even consider it?
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be called various things.
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be combined with "'X is good' = 'I want X.'" Hobbes endorses the combination of these formulas.
It's a cynical endorsement, because Hobbes doesn't really give a shit about promise-keeping -- not in any deep way.
Which may be why Curtis has said "Might makes right" at least a couple of times.
Hobbes's cynicism has nothing whatsoever in common with Biblical, Stoic, or Platonic accounts of what goodness and obligation boil down to. He likes honesty, sure; everyone likes someone else's honesty.
Any kind of "Good = maximizes-people's-X-on-average" doctrine can be called "Utilitarianism". X doesn't have to be pleasure, whatever that is.
Curtis has said that he wants to maximize every group's average feeling-okay-about-life-ness, which suggests that he diverges from this general formula in that groupings of individuals play some role in the calculation, but he hasn't made it clear exactly how the calculation is to be done. Presumably group-populations are discounted to some extent if not entirely -- otherwise the groupings would be irrelevant. So, for example, if there are 99 million Euros and 1 million Navajos, the Euro-group's average feeling-okay-about-life-ness quantity wouldn't matter 99 times as much as the average Navajo quantity. Would it matter twice as much, thought?
He also diverges from the general "utilitarian" formula in that he seems to think that no situation will be good if even a single group's members feel on average that their lives are crappy.
Maybe he'd say, "When I say 'good' and 'should' I'm just telling you what my friend the coming dictator and I want. We want every group's members to feel okay about life on average. If you share our desire then follow us and we'll get it done."
Another guy might agree that "X is good" means "I want X" but want the maximizing of average pleasure pure and simple. In that case he'd push "hedonic utilitarianism" as a practical program but he wouldn't be a utilitarian in a theoretical sense. Similarly, a "divine command theorist" might think that God has commanded us to maximize average pleasure.
Once you even start thinking there is a calculation to be done, you've gone down a wrong path. Curtis summarized his views years ago and called himself "pronomian" https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2008/06/olxi-truth-about-left-and-right/
Pronomianism is like traditional ethics, which is all about honesty. If the Europeans promise to respect the Navajo territory, then invade it, they have done evil. But if they've made no such promise, well, who really owns a piece of land? Their ancestors killed the previous inhabitants and so on. Total utility? Would they think about my utility, if the situation was reversed? If the answer is no, why even consider it?
What is the "pronomian" account of goodness?
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be called various things.
"'I should do X' = 'I promised to do X'" can be combined with "'X is good' = 'I want X.'" Hobbes endorses the combination of these formulas.
It's a cynical endorsement, because Hobbes doesn't really give a shit about promise-keeping -- not in any deep way.
Which may be why Curtis has said "Might makes right" at least a couple of times.
Hobbes's cynicism has nothing whatsoever in common with Biblical, Stoic, or Platonic accounts of what goodness and obligation boil down to. He likes honesty, sure; everyone likes someone else's honesty.